______________________________
Editor’s Foreword:
Here’s a load of utter crapola from the Washington Post crowd. Oh, yes… Potapov (a Cold War-era Langley propagandist), Mattingly (a semi-converted Southern Baptist), Dreher (a Catholic retread who makes himself out to be an Orthodox expert), Freddie M-G (her thoughts are so precious that you have to pay her 25 bucks a throw just to hear them), and Paffhausen (the obsequious disciple of a man deposed for nasty doings) suck up to this lot… not as badly as they do to the Moonies at the Washington Times or to the rightwing nutters on K Street… but they do suck up to this bunch, and they don’t contradict them (they might lose entrée to the right parties and seminars, then, kids). Again, you have to know what the haters of the Orthosphere say. They do want to cut out our heart and soul and replace it with American consumerism (that’s why you shouldn’t trust the “Orthodox” I named… they’re all drooling supporters of the “Me First” Republican Party). It’s rancid… but it’s a necessary read…
BMD
******
Two recent stories offer a revealing… and, to some, unsettling… view of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emerging state ideology. The new Putinism, you might call it, seems to be a fusion of two older Russian ideas… nationalism, sometimes with an anti-Western tinge, and conservative interpretations of Orthodox Christianity. Both stories portray the coalescing, Kremlin-pushed ideology as a response to rising dissent and, more broadly, an effort to fill an ideological vacuum that has, remained to some extent, since the collapse of the USSR two decades ago. The Financial Times’ Charles Clover chronicles the new ideology’s emergence in the typically vibrant city of St Petersburg, “long regarded as Russia’s liberal window to the West”, but now “the testing ground for a new wave of conservative, Orthodox church-going, pro-Kremlin patriotism that has gripped much of Russian officialdom”. Clover cites recent censorship of classic Russian works by Vladimir Nabokov and Sergei Rachmaninoff, as well as new law that forbids “yelping” and “stomping” at night, possibly aimed at curbing protests.
Through the previous twelve years of his hegemony, Mr Putin observed a balance between liberals and conservatives in the ranks of the elite, catering to each group in an effort to play one off against the other. Today, that balance appears to have been jettisoned after liberals deserted him, with protesters taking to the streets last December and high-ranking figures… such as his Finance Minister… joining the dissenters. The Kremlin has turned to the more conservative elements of society. More rural, older, and less educated, they respond well to Mr Putin’s nationalist and slightly paranoid rhetoric as defender of the Orthodox faith from blasphemers and protector of the nation against foreign plots.
In Moscow, Claire Bigg of Radio Free Europe finds indications of a Kremlin effort to institutionalise the new emphasis on nationalism… an entirely new government agency for “promoting patriotism” and safeguarding “the spiritual and moral foundations of Russian society”. It’s hard not to be reminded of Iran’s infamous censorship body, the “Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance”, although Russia’s Directorate for Social Projects appears more about cultivating friendly public sentiments than blocking outlawed ones. Bigg and analysts she spoke with portrayed the agency as an outgrowth of Putin’s “deepening hostility” toward foreign organisations, even comparing it to the Soviet-era propaganda department. However, the most significant link to the Soviet era may have to do with the national pride many Russians felt during their country’s height of power. Nonetheless, the initiative is likely to strike a chord with many Russians nostalgic for their country’s lost global clout. Advocates say the new agency could prove instrumental in both filling the ideological vacuum left by the Soviet collapse and rejuvenating the notion of patriotism, still almost exclusively tied to the USSR’s role in World War II.
Russia’s search for an ideology is a big deal for the populous, ethnically diverse country. This campaign’s propagandistic and anti-liberal overtones aside, it does, at least, seem to address this issue. Nevertheless, nationalism is a powerful force, and in Russia has had a complicated history. As EurasiaNet’s Igor Torbakov warned in February, when Putin appeared to begin his ideological campaign, Russian nationalism has at times carried ethnic overtones. About 80 percent of the country’s citizens are ethnic Russian, and, with birth rates below replacement and the population aging, the Russian economy relies heavily on immigrating minority groups. Widespread harassment of migrant workers is already a problem in Russia. A far-right Russian newspaper editor told the Financial Times, “Putin feels the coming of a catastrophe, of the domination of liberal forces which threaten him with the fate of Muammer Gaddafi. He’s fighting back by restoring the balance between the various ideological groups. In this way, he supports us”.
25 October 2012
Max Fisher
Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/10/25/the-new-putinism-nationalism-fused-with-conservative-christianity/?wprss=rss_world
Editor’s Afterword:
Much of this isn’t even true… but many of the konvertsy eat this shit up. Reflect well on the fact that Paffhausen does, and that Potapov was (or still is) part of the Langley dezinformatsiya machine, as he worked for the BBG, a known Langley front organisation… a fact known to all, it isn’t secret, and I’m unmasking no one. Oh, yes, Basil Rodzianko and Aleksandr Schmemann both took Langley’s shilling willingly, too… did I tell you that Potapov married into the Rodzianko clan (everyone knows how Potapov used the official ROCOR website to pursue a vendetta against a fellow Rodzianko clan-member in public… nice guy)? Fancy that… keeping it all in the family, no? This disgusting pabulum has as much truth in it as the typical Monomakhos post… that is, not much. As one of the Cabinet said about Monomakhos:
The Monomakhos crowd is still dancing around their cauldron… I hope that the hammer falls quickly on them…
This post is shit of the same vintage. However, you must stay informed. READ IT and heed what it means. People are swallowing lies, and that’s never good. The truth WILL set you free, but only if you let it…
BMD
Voices from Russia 
28 October 2012. You Can’t Make Shit Like This Up… The new Putinism: Nationalism Fused with Conservative Christianity
Tags: Cold War, Financial Times, K Street, Kremlin, Moscow, Orthosphere, political commentary, politics, Putin, Radio Free Europe, Russia, Russian, Russian history, Soviet, Soviet Union, United States, USA, USSR, Vladimir Nabokov, Vladimir Putin, Washington Post, Washington Times
______________________________
Editor’s Foreword:
Here’s a load of utter crapola from the Washington Post crowd. Oh, yes… Potapov (a Cold War-era Langley propagandist), Mattingly (a semi-converted Southern Baptist), Dreher (a Catholic retread who makes himself out to be an Orthodox expert), Freddie M-G (her thoughts are so precious that you have to pay her 25 bucks a throw just to hear them), and Paffhausen (the obsequious disciple of a man deposed for nasty doings) suck up to this lot… not as badly as they do to the Moonies at the Washington Times or to the rightwing nutters on K Street… but they do suck up to this bunch, and they don’t contradict them (they might lose entrée to the right parties and seminars, then, kids). Again, you have to know what the haters of the Orthosphere say. They do want to cut out our heart and soul and replace it with American consumerism (that’s why you shouldn’t trust the “Orthodox” I named… they’re all drooling supporters of the “Me First” Republican Party). It’s rancid… but it’s a necessary read…
BMD
******
Two recent stories offer a revealing… and, to some, unsettling… view of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emerging state ideology. The new Putinism, you might call it, seems to be a fusion of two older Russian ideas… nationalism, sometimes with an anti-Western tinge, and conservative interpretations of Orthodox Christianity. Both stories portray the coalescing, Kremlin-pushed ideology as a response to rising dissent and, more broadly, an effort to fill an ideological vacuum that has, remained to some extent, since the collapse of the USSR two decades ago. The Financial Times’ Charles Clover chronicles the new ideology’s emergence in the typically vibrant city of St Petersburg, “long regarded as Russia’s liberal window to the West”, but now “the testing ground for a new wave of conservative, Orthodox church-going, pro-Kremlin patriotism that has gripped much of Russian officialdom”. Clover cites recent censorship of classic Russian works by Vladimir Nabokov and Sergei Rachmaninoff, as well as new law that forbids “yelping” and “stomping” at night, possibly aimed at curbing protests.
Through the previous twelve years of his hegemony, Mr Putin observed a balance between liberals and conservatives in the ranks of the elite, catering to each group in an effort to play one off against the other. Today, that balance appears to have been jettisoned after liberals deserted him, with protesters taking to the streets last December and high-ranking figures… such as his Finance Minister… joining the dissenters. The Kremlin has turned to the more conservative elements of society. More rural, older, and less educated, they respond well to Mr Putin’s nationalist and slightly paranoid rhetoric as defender of the Orthodox faith from blasphemers and protector of the nation against foreign plots.
In Moscow, Claire Bigg of Radio Free Europe finds indications of a Kremlin effort to institutionalise the new emphasis on nationalism… an entirely new government agency for “promoting patriotism” and safeguarding “the spiritual and moral foundations of Russian society”. It’s hard not to be reminded of Iran’s infamous censorship body, the “Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance”, although Russia’s Directorate for Social Projects appears more about cultivating friendly public sentiments than blocking outlawed ones. Bigg and analysts she spoke with portrayed the agency as an outgrowth of Putin’s “deepening hostility” toward foreign organisations, even comparing it to the Soviet-era propaganda department. However, the most significant link to the Soviet era may have to do with the national pride many Russians felt during their country’s height of power. Nonetheless, the initiative is likely to strike a chord with many Russians nostalgic for their country’s lost global clout. Advocates say the new agency could prove instrumental in both filling the ideological vacuum left by the Soviet collapse and rejuvenating the notion of patriotism, still almost exclusively tied to the USSR’s role in World War II.
Russia’s search for an ideology is a big deal for the populous, ethnically diverse country. This campaign’s propagandistic and anti-liberal overtones aside, it does, at least, seem to address this issue. Nevertheless, nationalism is a powerful force, and in Russia has had a complicated history. As EurasiaNet’s Igor Torbakov warned in February, when Putin appeared to begin his ideological campaign, Russian nationalism has at times carried ethnic overtones. About 80 percent of the country’s citizens are ethnic Russian, and, with birth rates below replacement and the population aging, the Russian economy relies heavily on immigrating minority groups. Widespread harassment of migrant workers is already a problem in Russia. A far-right Russian newspaper editor told the Financial Times, “Putin feels the coming of a catastrophe, of the domination of liberal forces which threaten him with the fate of Muammer Gaddafi. He’s fighting back by restoring the balance between the various ideological groups. In this way, he supports us”.
25 October 2012
Max Fisher
Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/10/25/the-new-putinism-nationalism-fused-with-conservative-christianity/?wprss=rss_world
Editor’s Afterword:
Much of this isn’t even true… but many of the konvertsy eat this shit up. Reflect well on the fact that Paffhausen does, and that Potapov was (or still is) part of the Langley dezinformatsiya machine, as he worked for the BBG, a known Langley front organisation… a fact known to all, it isn’t secret, and I’m unmasking no one. Oh, yes, Basil Rodzianko and Aleksandr Schmemann both took Langley’s shilling willingly, too… did I tell you that Potapov married into the Rodzianko clan (everyone knows how Potapov used the official ROCOR website to pursue a vendetta against a fellow Rodzianko clan-member in public… nice guy)? Fancy that… keeping it all in the family, no? This disgusting pabulum has as much truth in it as the typical Monomakhos post… that is, not much. As one of the Cabinet said about Monomakhos:
This post is shit of the same vintage. However, you must stay informed. READ IT and heed what it means. People are swallowing lies, and that’s never good. The truth WILL set you free, but only if you let it…
BMD